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Abstract
We analyze productivity-improving mergers in Stackelberg mixed triopoly especially focusing on the
stability of coalition formations of owners of ﬁrms. We adopt the core as the solution concept of coalition
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leader, and the other is the case where each of these ﬁrms acts as a Stackelberg follower. In contrast to the
case of the Cournot competition in which it is known that the core is non-empty, a striking impossibility
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be empty, i.e. none of the market structures is stable.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical analysis on merger activities in the oligopoly composed not only of
private ﬁrms which maximize their proﬁts but also of a public ﬁrm which is a welfare maximizer. Such
an industry is usually referred to as mixed oligopoly, and the studies of the mixed oligopoly go back to De
Fraja and Delbono (1989). In contrast to the extensive literature on a merger activity in private oligopoly,1
not so many efforts have been carried out in studying a merger activity in mixed oligopoly. Exceptions
are Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Ga´rzon (2003), Coloma (2006), Kamijo and Nakamura (2007), and Kamaga and
Nakamura (2007). Among them, the papers of Kamijo and Nakamura and of Kamaga and Nakamura
provided the analyses on a merger activity especially focusing on the stability of coalition formations of
ﬁrms’ owners in the similar manner to Barros (1998), Horn and Persson (2001), and Straume (2006).
In the current paper, we work with the framework set up by Kamaga and Nakamura (2007). In their
paper, Kamaga and Nakamura considered the mixed triopoly of a single homogeneous product, i.e. the
industry composed of a public ﬁrm and two private ﬁrms producing a homogeneous product, and they
examined the case of the Cournot competition, i.e. the case of simultaneous moves of the three ﬁrms.
They adopted the core as the solution concept of coalition formations. Then, they obtained the result
that if a merger entails the improvement on productivity in a merged ﬁrm,2 the core is non-empty and it
consists solely of the market structures of the merger between the public ﬁrm and one of the two private
ﬁrms with the shareholding ratio by the owner of the pre-merged public ﬁrm in the merged ﬁrm near
around 0.57. This result shows that, as in the case of the private oligopoly,3 a merger activity in the mixed
oligopoly increases social welfare if it entails the improvement on productivity in a merged ﬁrm. Moreover,
it suggests a possible resolution to the surprising and somewhat counterintuitive result by Ba´rcena-Ruiz and
Ga´rzon (2003). Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Ga´rzon, in their model of mixed duopoly of two heterogeneous products,
assumed that a merger does not entail the improvement on productivity in the merged ﬁrm and showed that
a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm can reach an agreement on their merger only in the case of sufﬁciently low
degree of substitution between the two products and will never merge in the case of perfect substitution.
The result of non-empty core by Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) shows that a merger will also take place in
the case of perfect substitution if a merger yields the improvement on productivity.
1For example, Salant et al. (1983), Deneckere and Davidson (1985), and Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
2They adopted the similar type of quadratic cost functions to those considered in McAfee and Williams (1992).
3On the productivity-improving mergers in the private oligopoly, see Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
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The purpose of the paper is to examine whether or not the result of Kamaga and Nakamura (2007)
obtained for the Cournot equilibrium will change in accordance with an adopted equilibrium concept. The
robustness of a result concerning an adopted equilibrium concept has been extensively analyzed in the
literature on the mixed oligopoly.4 As an alternative to the Cournot equilibrium, we consider two forms of
the Stackelberg competition. One is the Stackelberg equilibrium where the public ﬁrm or a merged ﬁrm
in which the public ﬁrm participates acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the other is the one where each of
these ﬁrms acts as a Stackelberg follower. In contrast to the result by Kamaga and Nakamura (2007), we
obtained a striking result that the core is empty for each of the two forms of the Stackelberg competition.
In other words, none of the market structures is stable in either case.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 we introduce the model of mixed triopoly set up
by Kamaga and Nakamura (2007). In the model, there are four regimes in accordance with the forms of
a merger: (a) mixed triopoly; (b) merger between private ﬁrms; (c) merger between a public ﬁrm and a
private ﬁrm; and (d) merger among all the three ﬁrms. For each of the regimes, we provide the equilibrium
outcomes for each of the Cournot equilibrium and the two forms of the Stackelberg equilibrium. In Section
2.2 we elaborate the motivation to analyze the stability problem of owners’ coalition formations and also
provide a formal deﬁnition of the core of market structures. After reviewing the result obtained in Kamaga
and Nakamura (2007) in Section 3, we provide the main results of the current paper in Section 4. Section
5 concludes with some remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Four regimes in mixed triopoly model
We analyze a merger activity in the mixed triopoly, i.e. in the industry composed of a public ﬁrm and two
private ﬁrms. We work with the model set up by Kamaga and Nakamura (2007). A public ﬁrm is denoted
by 0 and two private ﬁrms by 1 and 2, respectively. Each ﬁrm produces a single homogeneous good and
is assumed to be entrepreneurial one, i.e. the owners themselves make every managerial decision making
of their ﬁrms. To make the analysis simple, the public ﬁrm is assumed to be owned by the government
and each of the private ﬁrms by a single private shareholder, respectively. In the mixed triopoly model,
4For example, in the context of privatization and subsidization, White (1996) and the subsequent papers: Poyago-Theotoky
(2001); Myles (2002); Fjell and Heywood (2004); and Hashimzade et al. (2007).
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we should consider the following four different market regimes (a) to (d) in accordance with which type
of mergers is actually realized among the ﬁrms: (a) mixed triopoly, i.e. the case where none of the ﬁrms
reach an agreement on a merger; (b) merger between private ﬁrms; (c) merger between a public ﬁrm and a
private ﬁrm; and (d) merger among all the three ﬁrms.
The four regimes are slightly different in their details of the formal descriptions. We begin with in-
troducing the regime of the mixed triopoly (a). The inverse demand function is linear in the total output
Q,
P(Q) = a¡Q; (1)
where a is a sufﬁciently large positive number. As assumed in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003), each ﬁrm
i (= 0;1;2) has an identical technology represented by the quadratic cost function:
C(qi) = q2i ; (2)
where qi is the quantity of the output by the ﬁrm i. The proﬁt function of the ﬁrm i (= 0;1;2) is given as:
Pi = (a¡Q)qi¡q2i : (3)
As usual, social welfare, denoted byW , is measured by the sum of consumer surplus CS = Q2=2, and the
ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The public ﬁrm is assumed to be a welfare maximizer, and then, its objective functionU0 is
given as:
U0(q0;q1;q2) =W =CS+P0+
2
å
i=1
Pi: (4)
On the other hand, the private ﬁrms are assumed to maximize their own proﬁts, and their objective functions
Ui are
Ui(qi;q0;q j) =Pi (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j): (5)
Next, we introduce the other three regimes, (b), (c), and (d). Each of these three regimes is described
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as an extension of the mixed triopoly. In our model, what makes these regimes different from the mixed
triopoly is not only the number of the ﬁrms but also cost functions of the merged ﬁrms which reﬂect a
synergy effect yielded by a merger. Although Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003) have not discussed the
case where a merger entails a synergy effect on productivity in a merged ﬁrm, we assume that a merger
yields a positive effect on productivity of a merged ﬁrm. In the case of homogeneous goods market, such
an assumption can be easily justiﬁed: e.g. operating the plants owned by the pre-merged ﬁrms in the most
efﬁcient way, or sharing the patents of the pre-merged ﬁrms. In the literature on a merger activity, McAfee
and Williams (1992) have analyzed a productivity-improving merger. We basically follow McAfee and
Williams, and assume that if n (= 2;3) ﬁrms merge into one ﬁrm, the total cost of the merged ﬁrm Cm is
represented as:
Cm(qm) =
q2m
n
; (6)
where qm is the output of the merged ﬁrm m.5 As we have suggested above, such a cost function is
supported by the assumption that the merged ﬁrm adopts the most efﬁcient operation plan of the plants
previously owned by the pre-merged ﬁrms. The proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm, Pm, is given by replacing q2i
with q2m=n in (3). Throughout the paper, a merged ﬁrm organized by pre-merged ﬁrms i and j is denoted
by simply combining the notation just as i j. We summarize the ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions in each of the four
regimes in Table 1, where proﬁt functions with superscript r (= a;b;c;d) denote those considered in the
regime r.
We now move to the objectives of the merged ﬁrms in the regimes (b), (c), and (d). In the regime
(b), the merged ﬁrm 12 is still completely private-owned, and thus its objective is to maximize the proﬁt
P12. On the other hand, in the regimes (c) and (d), the merged ﬁrm 01 (or 02) or 012 is jointly owned
by the owners of the pre-merged private ﬁrm 1 and/or 2 and the pre-merged public ﬁrm 0. Therefore, the
objective of the merged ﬁrm in these two regimes should reﬂect both of the objectives of the pre-merged
public ﬁrm and the pre-merged private ﬁrm(s). In this paper, we deﬁne the objectives of the merged ﬁrms
01, 02, and 012 as the weighted sum of social welfare and the proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm.6 Let b 2 [0;1] be
5The cost function deﬁned here is a special case of those considered by McAfee and Williams. Heywood and McGinty (2007a;
2007b) and Nakamura and Inoue (2007) have also assumed this type of cost functions.
6The weighted sum of social welfare and the proﬁt has ﬁrst been suggested by Matsumura (1998) for the objective of a ﬁrm
jointly owned by a public shareholder and private shareholders and have also been adopted in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003).
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Table 1: Firms’ proﬁt functions in each regime (r)
(r) proﬁt Pri
(a) Pai =
£
a¡ (q0+å2j=1 q j)
¤
qi¡ (qi)2 (i= 0;1;2)
(b) Pb0 =
£
a¡ (q0+q12)
¤
q0¡ (q0)2;
Pb12 =
£
a¡ (q0+q12)
¤
q12¡ (q12)2=2
(c) Pc0i =
£
a¡ (q0i+q j)
¤
q0i¡ (q0i)2=2;
Pcj =
£
a¡ (q0i+q j)
¤
q j¡ (q j)2 (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j)
(d) Pd012 = (a¡q012)q012¡ (q012)2=3
the shareholding ratio by the owner of the public ﬁrm 0 in the merged ﬁrm 0i (i = 1;2). We assume that
the shareholding ratio b by the owner of the public ﬁrm 0 directly measures the weight on social welfare
in the objective of the merged ﬁrm 0i. Similarly, let g 2 [0;1] denote the shareholding ratio by the owner of
the ﬁrm 0 in the merged ﬁrm 012 and measure the weight on social welfare in the ﬁrm’s objective. Table 2
provides the ﬁrms’ objective functions in each of the four regimes, where the functions with superscript r
(= a;b;c;d) denote those considered in the regime r.
Table 2: Firms’ objectives in each regime (r)
(r) objective functionU ri
(a) Ua0 =W
a = (q0+å2j=1 q j)2=2+Pa0+å
2
j=1Paj ;
Uai =P
a
i (i= 1;2)
(b) Ub0 =W
b = (q0+q12)2=2+Pb0+P
b
12;
Ub12 =P
b
12
(c) Uc0i = bW
c+(1¡b )Pc0i = b
£
(q0i+q j)2=2+Pc0i+P
c
j
¤
+(1¡b )Pc0i;
Ucj =P
c
j (i; j = 1;2, j 6= i)
(d) Ud012 = gW
d +(1¡ g)Pd012 = g
£
(q012)2=2+Pd012
¤
+(1¡ g)Pd012
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In this paper, we consider the following three equilibrium concepts mainly focusing on the last two
cases: (i) the Cournot equilibrium; (ii) the Stackelberg equilibrium where the public ﬁrm or the merged
ﬁrm in which the public ﬁrm participates acts as a Stackelberg leader; and (iii) the Stackelberg equilibrium
where the public ﬁrm or the merged ﬁrm in which the public ﬁrm participates acts as a Stackelberg follower.
In the rest of the paper, we refer to the last two equilibrium concepts as L-Stackelberg equilibrium and F-
Stackelberg equilibrium, respectively.
In each of the regimes, every ﬁrm chooses the output to maximize its objective given in the Table 2.
From the routine calculation, the equilibrium outputs for each of the three equilibrium concepts are given
in Table 3.
Table 3: Equilibrium outputs qr¤ in each regime (r)
(r) Cournot L-Stackelberg F-Stackelberg
(a) qa¤ =
¡
qa¤0 ;q
a¤
1 ;q
a¤
2
¢ ¡ 3a
13 ;
2a
13 ;
2a
13
¢ ¡ 13a
63 ;
10a
63 ;
10a
63
¢ ¡2a
9 ;
a
6 ;
a
6
¢
(b) qb¤ =
¡
qb¤0 ;q
b¤
12
¢ ¡a
4 ;
a
4
¢ ¡5a
23 ;
6a
23
¢ ¡5a
21 ;
2a
7
¢
(c) qc¤ =
¡
qc¤0i ;q
c¤
j
¢ ¡ 3a
11¡4b ;
(2¡b )a
11¡4b
¢ ¡ (12¡b )a
40¡13b ;
(7¡3b )a
40¡13b
¢ ¡ (8¡3b )a
2(5¡2b )(3¡b ) ;
(2¡b )a
2(5¡2b )
¢
(d) qd¤ = qd¤012
3a
8¡3g same as left same as left
2.2 merger as a coalition formation and stable market structures
Assuming the ﬁrms are entrepreneurial ones, a managerial decision making about a merger is the one
conducted by the owner of a ﬁrm such as “agree or not agree to merge” and “break off a merger.” Conse-
quently, merger activities of the three ﬁrms, 0, 1, and 2, can be analyzed in terms of coalition formations
among the owners of the ﬁrms. In the analysis of coalition formations, the most fundamental and most
important problem is the stability of coalition formations. As in the papers of Barros (1998), Horn and
Persson (2001), Straume (2006), Kamijo and Nakamura (2007), and Kamaga and Nakamura (2007), we
adopt the core as the solution concept of coalition formations and explore the stable coalition formations,
or the stable market structures. In the rest of the paper, the notation 0, 1, and 2 is also used to denote the
owners of these ﬁrms 0, 1, and 2, respectively. A market structure is characterized in terms of coalition for-
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mations among the three owners 0, 1, and 2, and also of the shareholding ratios by the participating owners
in the merged ﬁrm. In the preceding subsection, we introduced b and g as the shareholding ratio by the
owner 0 in the merged ﬁrm in the regimes (c) and (d), respectively. To complete the formal description of
each market structure, we need to introduce the additional notation. Let a 2 [0;1] be the shareholding ratio
by the owner 1 in the merged ﬁrm of the regime (b), i.e. in the private merged ﬁrm 12, and also d 2 [0;1]
be the distribution ratio of the proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm 012 between the owners 1 and 2. We interpret that
(1¡ g)d (resp. (1¡ g)(1¡d )) is the shareholding ratio by the owner 1 (resp. the owner 2) in the merged
ﬁrm 012. We denote by MfCgt a market structure composed of a coalition formation C with a shareholding
ratio t in the merged ﬁrm (if exists), where fCg is a partition of the set of the owners f0;1;2g and t will be
a in the regime (b); b in (c); and a pair of g and d in (d).7 For example, the market structure of the merger
between the public ﬁrm 0 and the private ﬁrm 1 with the owner 0’s shareholding ratio b = 0:5 is denoted
by Mff0;1g;f2ggb=0:5 (see also Figure 1).
We next deﬁne the payoffs to the owners. Each of the owners determines the managerial decision on
a merger to maximize her/his own payoff. The owner of the public ﬁrm 0 is assumed to be a welfare
maximizer and the owners of the two private ﬁrms 1 and 2 to be proﬁt maximizers. Then, the payoff to the
owner 0 in a regime r (= a;b;c;d), denoted by V r0 , is the equilibrium social welfare W
r¤ in the regime r,
and those to the owners 1 and 2 are (i) the equilibrium proﬁts of their own ﬁrms in the regime (a) and (ii)
the distributed equilibrium proﬁts determined according to their shareholding ratio(s) in the merged ﬁrm in
the regimes (b) to (d). Table 4 describes the payoffs to the owners in each regime (r), where the variables
with asterisk denote those evaluated in an adopted equilibrium.
The purpose of the paper is to examine which of the market structures is/are stable in terms of the
owners’ coalition formations. In the presence of more than two owners (one for each ﬁrm), it is not
sufﬁcient to simply analyze incentives of the owners in each particular case of the merger. An example
will help understanding the importance of analyzing the stability problem. Consider the following four
market structures (one for each regime (r)): Mff0g;f1g;f2gg in (a);Mff0g;f1;2gga=0:5 in (b);M
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=0:5 in (c); and
Mff0;1;2ggg=0:33;d=0:5 in (d). Suppose that the owners’ preference orderings over these four market structures are
derived as follows according to the payoffs to them:
7A partition of a set A is a set of subsets of A such that (i) the union of its elements is equal to A, and (ii) the intersection of
any two of its elements is empty. We allow the case where a partition of f0;1;2g contains an empty set as an element.
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Table 4: Owners’ payoffs V ri in each regime (r)
(r) payoffs (V a0 ;V
a
1 ;V
a
2 )
(a)
³
V a0 ;V
a
1 ;V
a
2
´
=
³
W a¤; Pa¤1 ; P
a¤
2
´
(b)
³
V b0 ;V
b
1 ;V
b
2
´
=
³
W b¤; aPb¤12; (1¡a)Pb¤12
´
(c)
³
V c0 ;V
c
i ;V
c
j
´
=
³
W c¤; (1¡b )Pc¤0i ; Pc¤j
´
; (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j)
(d)
³
V d0 ;V
d
1 ;V
d
2
´
=
³
W d¤; (1¡ g)dPd¤012; (1¡ g)(1¡d )Pd¤012
´
Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Â0 Mff0;1;2ggg=0:33;d=0:5 Â0 M
ff0g;f1;2gg
a=0:5 Â0 Mff0;1g;f2ggb=0:5 ;
Mff0;1g;f2ggb=0:5 Â1 M
ff0;1;2gg
g=0:33;d=0:5 Â1 M
ff0g;f1;2gg
a=0:5 Â1 Mff0g;f1g;f2gg;
Mff0;1g;f2ggb=0:5 Â2 M
ff0;1;2gg
g=0:33;d=0:5 Â2 M
ff0g;f1;2gg
a=0:5 Â2 Mff0g;f1g;f2gg;
where a Âi b means the owner i prefers a to b. Now, suppose that Mff0g;f1g;f2gg is temporarily realized.
Then, the owners 1 and 2 will jointly deviate and Mff0g;f1g;f2gg will shift into Mff0g;f1;2gga=0:5 because both
of them can gain higher payoffs. By the same reason, every owner now wants to shift into Mff0;1;2ggg=0:33;d=0:5
from Mff0g;f1;2gga=0:5 . M
ff0;1;2gg
g=0:33;d=0:5 is still unstable because the owner 2 can gain much higher payoff if s/he
deviates from the merger and operate her/his own ﬁrm in Mff0;1g;f2ggb=0:5 . Thus, M
ff0;1;2gg
g=0:33;d=0:5 will shift into
Mff0;1g;f2ggb=0:5 through the deviation by the owner 2. Now, in the market structure M
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=0:5 , the owner of
the ﬁrm 0 in turn has an incentive to deviate and to shift intoMff0g;f1g;f2gg. Then, we inevitably come back
to the market structure we started this observation. The cycle we just observed is depicted in Figure 1.
Mff0g;f1g;f2gg
Mff0;1g;f2ggb=0:5M
ff0g;f1;2gg
a=0:5
Mff0;1;2ggg=0:33;d=0:5
f1;2g
f0;1;2g f2g
f0g
(a)
(b) (c)
(d)
Figure 1: A typical market structure in regime (r) and a cycle in deviations
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In this paper, we invoke the core, the well-established solution concept in cooperative game theory
to examine the stable market structures. In order to deﬁne the core of the market structures, we should
start with the deﬁnitions of inducement relations among the market structures and of a blocking market
structure.
A market structure M is said to be inducible from M0 via a coalition S µ f0;1;2g if, given that the
coalition structure inM0 is represented as the partition fS01; : : : ;S0ng, the coalition structure inM is described
as the partition fS;S1; : : : ;Sng such that
Si =
8><>:
S0i if S\S0i =?;
S0inS if S\S0i 6=?;
(7)
for all i = 1; : : : ;n. In other words, a market structure M is inducible from a structure M0 via a coalition S
if the deviant coalition S can generate the new structure M only through their deviation without any coop-
eration of the owners outside of the coalition. We should give two remarks about the inducibility we just
deﬁned in general form. The ﬁrst is that the above deﬁnition of inducibility among market structures allows
the case where the deviation by the stand-alone coalition f0g (resp. fig (i= 1;2)) from Mff0;1;2ggg2[0;1];d2[0;1] can
generate the market structure Mff0g;f1;2gga with any of her/his desired ratios a 2 [0;1] (resp. Mf0; jg;figb with
any of her/his desired ratios b 2 [0;1]). Since it seems unreasonable to assume that the deviant owner has
a decisive inﬂuence on the shareholding ratios in the merged ﬁrm organized by the rest of the owners, we
restrict admissible inducement relations as follows: in the case of the deviation by f0g fromMff0;1;2ggg2[0;1];d2[0;1],
Mff0g;f1;2gga with a = d (8)
is solely inducible; and in the case of the deviation by f1g (resp. f2g) from Mff0;1;2ggg2[0;1];d2[0;1],
Mff0;1g;f2ggb with b =
g
g+(1¡ g)d
³
resp. Mff0;2g;f1ggb with b =
g
g+(1¡ g)(1¡d )
´
(9)
is solely inducible, i.e. the shareholding ratios are determined according to those of the two owners in the
merged ﬁrm 012. In the rest of the paper, we restrict our analysis to the admissible inducement relations and
use the terms “inducement relations” and “inducible” to mean those restricted to the admissible cases. The
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second remark is that our deﬁnition does not allow the case where market structure of the mixed triopoly
is directly induced from a market structure of the merger among the three ﬁrms, i.e. that of the regime (d).
We eliminate such a case to make our analysis simple. However, as will be shown later, this simpliﬁcation
never detracts the generality and relevance of our core analysis.
A market structure M is said to block a market structure M0 via a coalition S µ f0;1;2g if (i) M is
inducible from M0 via S, and (ii) Vi > V 0i for all i 2 S, where Vi (resp. V 0i ) denotes the payoff to i in M
(resp. in M0). By deﬁnition, if a market structure M blocks M0 via a coalition S, each of the owners in the
coalition S has an incentive to deviate from M0 and induce M. Consequently, a blocked market structure
will never be realized. We writeM ÂS M0 to meanM blocksM0 via S. We are now ready to deﬁne the core
of the market structures.
The core is the set of market structures each of which is never blocked by any other market structure. In
other words, a market structureM belongs to the core if there is no market structureM0 such thatM0 ÂS M
for some S µ f0;1;2g. We denote the core of the market structures by Co. By deﬁnition, if a market
structure is in the core, all of the three owners have no incentive to deviate and to induce any other market
structure. In this sense, a market structure in the core is regarded as a stable one.
3 Cournot competition
We brieﬂy review the case of the Cournot competition which was analyzed in Kamaga and Nakamura
(2007). In the Cournot equilibrium of each regime (r), we have the following equilibrium payoffs to the
three owners (V r0 ;V
r
1 ;V
r
2 ):
(V a0 ;V
a
1 ;V
a
2 ) =
Ã
99a2
338
;
8a2
169
;
8a2
169
!
; (10a)
(V b0 ;V
b
1 ;V
b
2 ) =
Ã
9a2
32
;
3aa2
32
;
3(1¡a)a2
32
!
; (10b)
(V c0 ;V
c
i ;V
c
j ) =
Ã
(68¡44b +5b 2)a2
2(11¡4b )2 ;
9(3¡2b )(1¡b )a2
2(11¡4b )2 ;
2(2¡b )2a2
(11¡4b )2
!
; (10c)
(V d0 ;V
d
1 ;V
d
2 ) =
Ã
3(11¡6g)a2
2(8¡3g)2 ;
3(4¡3g)(1¡ g)da2
(8¡3g)2 ;
3(4¡3g)(1¡ g)(1¡d )a2
(8¡3g)2
!
(10d)
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In the paper of Kamaga and Nakamura, it has been shown that the core is non-empty in the case of the
Cournot competition and also that the core consists solely of the market structures of the merger between
the public ﬁrm 0 and one of the two private ﬁrm i with the share ratio b in [b ; b¯ ], where
b =
638¡39p31
739
¼ 0:56950 and b¯ = 6197¡39
p
6001
5572
¼ 0:56996: (11)
Their result (Kamaga and Nakamura (2007), Proposition 1) is formally stated as follows.
Proposition 1. In the case of the Cournot competition, the market structure of the public-private merged
ﬁrm 0i and the private ﬁrm j 6= i, Mff0;ig;f jggb , is in the core whenever the ratio of shareholding by the
owner 0 in the merged ﬁrm 0i, b , is in the closed interval [b ; b¯ ], and moreover, the core consists solely of
these market structures, i.e. Co=
©
Mff0;ig;f jggb : b 2 [b ; b¯ ]; i; j = 1;2; i 6= j
ª
.
In the next section, we examine to what extent an adopted equilibrium concept affects the core of
market structures for each of the L-Stackelberg equilibrium and the F-Stackelberg equilibrium.
4 L-Stackelberg competition and F-Stackelberg competition
In the case of the merger among all the three ﬁrms, i.e. the regime (d), the L-Stackelberg equilibrium
coincides with the Cournot equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium payoffs in the regime (d), (V d0 ;V
d
1 ;V
d
2 ), are
given by (10d). In the other three regimes (a)-(c), the equilibrium payoffs to the three owners are given as
follows:
(V a0 ;V
a
1 ;V
a
2 ) =
Ã
37a2
126
;
200a2
3969
;
200a2
3969
!
; (12a)
(V b0 ;V
b
1 ;V
b
2 ) =
Ã
13a2
46
;
54aa2
529
;
54(1¡a)a2
529
!
; (12b)
(V c0 ;V
c
i ;V
c
j ) =
Ã
(917¡554b +69b 2)a2
2(40¡13b )2 ;
(1¡b )(12¡b )(30¡17b )a2
2(40¡13b )2 ;
2(7¡3b )2a2
(40¡13b )2
!
(12c)
In the case of the L-Stackelberg competition, we obtain the following striking but serious impossibility
result.
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Proposition 2. In the case of the L-Stackelberg competition, none of the market structures belongs to the
core, i.e. Co=?.
Proof. The proof proceeds through a series of claims (a) to (d). In each claim (r) (= a, b, c, d), it will
be shown that, for any market structureM in the regime (r), we can ﬁnd some other market structure which
blocks M via some coalition Sµ f0;1;2g, i.e. we explicitly provide M0 and S such that M0 ÂS M.
Claim (a): Mff0g;f1;2gga2(a;a¯) Âf1;2g Mff0g;f1g;f2gg, where a = 52900107163 and a¯ = 54263107163 .
This claim is easily checked as follows:
V b1 (a)¡V a1 =
¡2a2(52900¡107163a)
2099601
> 0 , a > 52900
107163
; (13)
V b2 (a)¡V a2 =
2a2(54263¡107163a)
2099601
> 0 , a < 54263
107163
: (14)
Thus, the joint deviation by f0;1g will take place if a 2 ¡ 52900107163 ; 54263107163¢.
Claim (b): (i) Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Âf1g Mff0g;f1;2gga in any case of a 2
£
0; 52900107163
¢
;
(ii) Mff0;ig;f jggb=1=2 Âf0;1g M
ff0g;f1;2gg
a in any case of a 2
£ 52900
107163 ;
54263
107163
¤
;8
(iii) Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Âf2g Mff0g;f1;2gga in any case of a 2
¡ 54263
107163 ;1
¤
.
Since the equivalence assertions in (13) and (14) still hold when we reverse the inequality signs, (i) and
(iii) are straightforward. We prove (ii). Assume, without loss of generality, i= 1. For the owner 0, we have
V c0 (b )¡V b0 =
a2(291+778b ¡610b 2)
46(40¡13b )2 > 0; 8b 2 [0;1]; (15)
because d(V
c
0 (b )¡V b0 )
db =
841a2(1¡b )
(40¡13b )3 ¸ 0 for all b 2 [0;1] andV c0 (b )jb=0¡V b0 = 291a
2
73600 > 0. On the other hand,
for the owner 1, we have
V c1 (b )jb= 12 ¡V
b
1 (a)ja= 54263107163 =
127812533a2
37700435556
> 0: (16)
8This result can be generalized for any b 2 [0;0:529309).
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Note that 54263107163 = argmaxa2[ 52900107163 ; 54263107163 ]V
b
1 (a). Thus, by (15) and (16), M
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=1=2 Âf0;1g M
ff0g;f1;2gg
a in
any case of a 2 [ 52900107163 ; 54263107163 ].
Claim (c): (i) Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Âf0g Mff0;ig;f jggb in any case of b 2
£
0; 1789¡261
p
7
1906
¢
;
(ii) Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Âfig Mff0;ig;f jggb in any case of b 2
£1789¡261p7
1906 ;1
¤
.
Assume, without loss of generality, i= 1. For the owner 0, we have
V a0 ¡V c0 (b ) =
a2(1429¡3578b +1906b 2)
126(40¡13b )2 > 0 , 0· b <
1789¡261p7
1906
¼ 0:576316: (17)
On the other hand, taking into account that d(V
a
1 ¡V c1 (b ))
db =
a2(14400¡12358b+2040b 2¡221b 3)
2(40¡13b )3 > 0 for all b 2 [0;1],
we have
V a1 ¡V c1 (b ) =
¡a2(788840¡1941586b +928619b 2¡67473b 3)
7938(40¡13b )2 > 0; 8b 2
h1789¡261p7
1906
;1
i
;
(18)
since V a1 ¡V c1 (b )jb= 1789¡261p71906 =
(592531¡200361p7)a2
15129828 > 0. Thus, the statement (i) follows from (17), and (ii)
does form (18), respectively.
Claim (d): (i) Mff0;1g;f2ggb=g Âf0;1g M
ff0;1;2gg
g;d in any case of g 2
£
0; 34
¢
and d 2 [0;1];
(ii) Mff0;1g;f2ggb= gg+(1¡g)d
Âf2g Mff0;1;2ggg;d in any case of g 2
£3
4 ;1
¤
and d 2 [0;1].
We begin with the proof of (i). For the payoff to the owner of the public ﬁrm 0, we have
V c0 (b )jb=g ¡V d0 (g)> 0 8g <
3
4
(19)
from the fact that d(V
c
0 (b )jb=g¡V d0 (g))
dg =
¡4a2(1¡g)(324352¡300096g+91476g2¡9153g3)
(8¡3g)3(40¡13g)3 · 0 for all g 2 [0;1] and
V c0 (b )jb= 34 ¡V
d
0 (g)jg= 34 =
5213a2
15490178 > 0. For the payoff to the owner of the private ﬁrm 1, we also ob-
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tain,
V c1 (b )jb=g ¡V d1 (g;d )jd= 12 > 0; 8g <
3
4
; (20)
because we have
d
¡
V c1 (b )jb=g¡V d1 (g;d )jd= 12
¢
dg =
¡a2(1228800¡3447296g+4271808g2¡2492728g3+723645g4¡102816g5+5967g6)
2(8¡3g)3(40¡13g)3 <
0 for all g 2 [0;1] and V c1 (b )jb= 34 ¡V
d
1 (g;d )jg= 34 ;d= 12 =
412701a2
61960712 > 0. Thus, by (19) and (20), we obtain
Mff0;1g;f2ggb=g Âf0;1g M
ff0;1;2gg
g< 34 ;d=
1
2
. Since in the cases of d 6= 12 either of the two owners 1 and 2 will receive
smaller payoff than in the case of d = 12 , we can apply the above argument to the owner with the smaller
payoff and complete the proof of (i).
Next, we prove (ii). Because d = 0 is the most favorable case of d for the owner 2, it is sufﬁcient to
show that Mff0;1;2ggg¸ 34 ;d=0
is blocked by Mff0;1g;f2ggb= gg+(1¡g)d
, i.e. by Mff0;1g;f2ggb=1 , via f2g. In M
ff0;1;2gg
g¸ 34 ;d=0
, the payoff to the
owner of the private ﬁrm 2 is given as:
V d2 (g;d )jd=0 =
3a2(1¡ g)(4¡3g)
(8¡3g)2 : (21)
From the fact that dV
d
2 (g;d )jd=0
dg =
¡3a2(32¡27g)
(8¡3g)3 < 0 for all g 2
£3
4 ;1
¤
,
max
g2[ 34 ;1]
V d2 (g;d )jd=0 =V d
³3
4
;0
´
=
21a2
529
: (22)
On the other hand, in the market structure Mff0;1g;f2ggb=1 , the payoff to the owner of the private ﬁrm 2 is
V c2 (b )jb=1 =
2a2(7¡3b )2
(40¡13b )2
¯¯¯
b=1
=
32a2
729
>
21a2
529
= max
g2[ 34 ;1]
V d2 (g;d )jd=0: (23)
Thus,Mff0;1g;f2ggb=1 Âf2g M
ff0;1;2gg
g;d=0 for any case of g 2
£3
4 ;1
¤
. ¥
By the deﬁnition of the core, in the case of the L-Stackelberg competition, none of the market structures
is stable in the sense that there always exists at least one owner who wants to deviate and induce a new
market structure: in the regime (a), the private owners 1 and 2; in (b), the coalition of the owners 0 and i
(= 1;2) or a single private owner j (= 1;2); in (c), either of the owners 0 and i (= 1;2); and in (d), the two
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owners 0 and i (= 1;2), or a single private owner j (= 1;2).
As we have shown in Claim (d), the market structures in the regime (d) are blocked by those in the
regime (c). This result is due to that the positive effect of the improvement on productivity entailed through
the shift of a market structure from the regime (c) (or also (b)) into (d) is relatively smaller than in the
cases of the shift from (a) into (c) (or also (b)). We obtain basically the same result for each of the other
equilibrium concepts: the Cournot equilibrium and the F-Stackelberg equilibrium (on this, see Lemma 1 in
Kamaga and Nakamura (2007) and our Claim (d)’ we will present later). As a consequence, although our
deﬁnition of the inducibility among the market structures does not allow the case where the market structure
of the mixed triopoly is directly induced from those in the regime (d), it never detracts the generality of our
core analysis.
Comparing the result in the Cournot competition and that of the L-Stackelberg competition, it can
be said that in our model of the productivity-improving mergers the order of the ﬁrms’ moves affects
the stability of market structures. The difference between the two results is due to the two facts. One
is that every owner gains higher payoff in the mixed triopoly in the L-Stackelberg equilibrium than in
the Cournot equilibrium. The other is that the proﬁt of the private merged ﬁrm 12 in the L-Stackelberg
equilibrium is higher than in the Cournot equilibrium and, moreover, it increases at a higher rate than
the proﬁt of a private ﬁrm in the mixed triopoly: the former is
¡54a2
529 ¡ 3a
2
32
¢
=3a
2
32 ¼ 0:089, and the latter
is
¡200a2
3969 ¡ 8a
2
169
¢
= 8a
2
169 ¼ 0:064, i.e. the improvement on productivity by the merger between the private
ﬁrms has relatively large impact in the L-Stackelberg equilibrium rather than in the Cournot equilibrium.
This latter fact is ascribed to the coordinating role of the public ﬁrm 0 which, anticipating the subsequent
decision making by the private merged ﬁrm 12 that has relatively efﬁcient production technology, decreases
its output level qb¤0 from the level in the Cournot equilibrium,
a
4 , to
5a
23 so as to maximize social welfare
through a possible subsequent increase of the output by the merged ﬁrm 12. Kamaga and Nakamura
(2007), in their lemma 2, showed that in the Cournot competition the market structure of the mixed triopoly
Mff0g;f1g;f2gg blocks any market structure of the merger between the private ﬁrmsMff0g;f1;2gga , and, in their
lemma 3, that the market structure of the merger between the public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm Mff0;ig;f jggb2(b ;b¯ )
blocks the mixed triopoly. In the L-Stackelberg equilibrium, these two forms of blocking are no longer
possible. Because of the expansion of its output level in the regime (b) from a4 to
6a
23 , the proﬁt of the
merged ﬁrm 12 becomes high enough to induce the deviation of the private owners f1;2g from the mixed
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triopoly (Claim (a)). However, since the regime (b) is less competitive than the mixed triopoly, the total
output in the regime (b), 11a23 , is now smaller than in the mixed triopoly,
11a
21 , and the social welfare decreases
from the level in the regime (a), 37a
2
126 , to
13a2
46 . Consequently, while any market structure of the regime (c)
is blocked by the mixed triopoly (Claim (c)), some of the market structures of the regime (c) blocks those
in the regime (b) with a 2 £ 52900107163 ; 54263107163¤ (Claim (b)).
We next examine another form of the Stackelberg competition where the public ﬁrm 0 and the public-
private ﬁrm 0i now act as a Stackelberg follower, i.e. the F-Stackelberg competition. As in the case of the
L-Stackelberg competition, the equilibrium payoffs in the regime (d), (V d0 ;V
d
1 ;V
d
2 ), in the F-Stackelberg
equilibrium are given by (10d). In the other three regimes, the equilibrium payoffs in the F-Stackelberg
equilibrium are obtained as:
(V a0 ;V
a
1 ;V
a
2 ) =
Ã
8a2
27
;
5a2
108
;
5a2
108
!
; (24a)
(V b0 ;V
b
1 ;V
b
2 ) =
Ã
85a2
294
;
2aa2
21
;
2(1¡a)a2
21
!
; (24b)
(V c0 ;V
c
i ;V
c
j ) =
Ã
(508¡704b +349b 2¡72b 3+5b 4)a2
8(15¡11b +2b 2)2 ;
(8¡3b )2(1¡b )(3¡2b )a2
8(15¡11b +2b 2)2 ;
(2¡b )2a2
60¡44b +8b 2
!
(24c)
Unfortunately, we still obtain the following impossibility result in the F-Stackelberg competition, ei-
ther.
Proposition 3. In the case of the L-Stackelberg competition, none of the market structures belongs to the
core, i.e. Co=?.
Proof. The proof is basically same as that of Proposition 2. We limit ourselves to providing the
following claims (a)’ to (d)’, and omit the detailed proofs similar to those in the proof of Proposition 2.
Claim (a)’: Mff0g;f1;2gga2(a;a¯) Âf1;2g Mff0g;f1g;f2gg, where a = 3572 and a¯ = 3772 .
Claim (b)’: (i) Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Âf1g Mff0g;f1;2gga in any case of a 2
£
0; 3572
¢
;
(ii)Mff0;1g;f2ggb=1=2 Âf0;1g M
ff0g;f1;2gg
a in any case of a 2
£35
72 ;
37
72
¤
;
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(iii) Mff0g;f1g;f2gg Âf2g Mff0g;f1;2gga in any case of a 2
¡37
72 ;1
¤
.
Claim (c)’: (i)M ff0g;f1g;f2gg Âf0g Mff0;ig;f jggb in any case of b 2
£
0; 35
¢
;
(ii)M ff0g;f1g;f2gg Âfig Mff0;ig;f jggb in any case of b 2
£3
5 ;1
¤
.
Claim (d)’: (i) Mff0;1g;f2ggb=g Âf0;1g M
ff0;1;2gg
g;d in any case of g 2
£
0; 45
¢
and d 2 [0;1];
(ii)Mff0;1g;f2ggb= gg+(1¡g)d
Âf2g Mff0;1;2ggg;d in any case of g 2
£4
5 ;1
¤
and d 2 [0;1]. ¥
In the case of the F-Stackelberg competition, we obtain the same pattern of blockings between the
market structures. As in the case of the L-Stackelberg equilibrium, the key is that, by the coordinating role
of the public ﬁrm 0, the merged ﬁrm 12 in the regime (b) can achieve relatively higher proﬁt than in the
case of the Cournot equilibrium.
Finally, it should be noted that the two impossibility results obtained in Propositions 2 and 3 are due
to the positive effect of the improvement on productivity entailed by a merger which is formulated in (6).
From a series of deviations demonstrated in the proofs of the propositions, it is easily veriﬁed that if this
positive effect is weakened the market structure of the mixed triopoly will solely belong to the core.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper examined a merger activity in mixed oligopoly especially focusing on the stability of owners’
coalition formations. As in the paper of Kamaga and Nakamura (2007), we adopted the core as the solution
concept to analyze the stability of coalition formations, and we mainly considered the two alternative forms
of the Stackelberg competition: one is the L-Stackelberg equilibrium where the public ﬁrm or the public-
private merged ﬁrm acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the other is the F-Stackelberg equilibrium where each
of these ﬁrms acts as a Stackelberg follower. In contrast to the case of the Cournot equilibrium examined in
Kamaga and Nakamura (2007), we obtained a striking but serious impossibility result that in each case of
the two alternative forms of the Stackelberg competition the core must be empty. In other words, none of
the market structures is stable in either case. As noted in the last section, the mixed triopoly will uniquely
belong to the core if the positive effect on the production cost entailed by a merger is weakened.
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Two interesting extensions of our model remain. The ﬁrst is to assume the separation between owner-
ship and management and to introduce managerial delegation in a ﬁrm. In the current paper, we assumed
that all of the three ﬁrms are entrepreneurial ones to make our analysis as simple as possible. In the case of
the separation of ownership and management, we should reformulate the model to consider the problem of
strategic delegation in the contract a` la Fershtman, Judd, and Sklivas (Fershtman and Judd (1987); Sklivas
(1987)). The other possible extension is to consider the model in which the foreign shareholders are taken
into account. In this case, social welfare that the government aims to maximize should become indepen-
dent of the proﬁts of the foreign-owned ﬁrms, and thus, the public ﬁrm’s decision making and resulting
equilibrium outcomes will change. These issues are left for future research.
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Figure 1: A typical market structure in each regime (r) and a cycle in deviations
Table 1: Firms’ proﬁt functions in each regime (r)
(r) proﬁt Pri
(a) Pai =
£
a¡ (q0+å2j=1 q j)
¤
qi¡ (qi)2 (i= 0;1;2)
(b) Pb0 =
£
a¡ (q0+q12)
¤
q0¡ (q0)2;
Pb12 =
£
a¡ (q0+q12)
¤
q12¡ (q12)2=2
(c) Pc0i =
£
a¡ (q0i+q j)
¤
q0i¡ (q0i)2=2;
Pcj =
£
a¡ (q0i+q j)
¤
q j¡ (q j)2 (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j)
(d) Pd012 = (a¡q012)q012¡ (q012)2=3
Table 2: Firms’ objectives in each regime (r)
(r) objective functionU ri
(a) Ua0 =W
a = (q0+å2j=1 q j)2=2+Pa0+å
2
j=1Paj ;
Uai =P
a
i (i= 1;2)
(b) Ub0 =W
b = (q0+q12)2=2+Pb0+P
b
12;
Ub12 =P
b
12
(c) Uc0i = bW
c+(1¡b )Pc0i = b
£
(q0i+q j)2=2+Pc0i+P
c
j
¤
+(1¡b )Pc0i;
Ucj =P
c
j (i; j = 1;2, j 6= i)
(d) Ud012 = gW
d +(1¡ g)Pd012 = g
£
(q012)2=2+Pd012
¤
+(1¡ g)Pd012
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Table 3: Equilibrium outputs qr¤ in each regime (r)
(r) Cournot L-Stackelberg F-Stackelberg
(a) qa¤ =
¡
qa¤0 ;q
a¤
1 ;q
a¤
2
¢ ¡ 3a
13 ;
2a
13 ;
2a
13
¢ ¡ 13a
63 ;
10a
63 ;
10a
63
¢ ¡2a
9 ;
a
6 ;
a
6
¢
(b) qb¤ =
¡
qb¤0 ;q
b¤
12
¢ ¡a
4 ;
a
4
¢ ¡5a
23 ;
6a
23
¢ ¡5a
21 ;
2a
7
¢
(c) qc¤ =
¡
qc¤0i ;q
c¤
j
¢ ¡ 3a
11¡4b ;
(2¡b )a
11¡4b
¢ ¡ (12¡b )a
40¡13b ;
(7¡3b )a
40¡13b
¢ ¡ (8¡3b )a
(5¡2b )(6¡2b ) ;
(2¡b )a
2(5¡2b )
¢
(d) qd¤ = qd¤012
3a
8¡3g same as left same as left
Table 4: Owners’ payoffs V ri in each regime (r)
(r) payoffs (V a0 ;V
a
1 ;V
a
2 )
(a)
³
V a0 ;V
a
1 ;V
a
2
´
=
³
W a¤; Pa¤1 ; P
a¤
2
´
(b)
³
V b0 ;V
b
1 ;V
b
2
´
=
³
W b¤; aPb¤12; (1¡a)Pb¤12
´
(c)
³
V c0 ;V
c
i ;V
c
j
´
=
³
W c¤; (1¡b )Pc¤0i ; Pc¤j
´
; (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j)
(d)
³
V d0 ;V
d
1 ;V
d
2
´
=
³
W d¤; (1¡ g)dPd¤012; (1¡ g)(1¡d )Pd¤012
´
23
